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The present paper investigates the number of bank relationships of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Switzerland using survey data from 1996 and 2002. We differentiate between 
overall bank relationships and lending relationships and disaggregate the loan market with 
respect to firm sizes, industries and banking groups. On average, bank lending declined, 
while the role of housebank relationships increased in 1996-2002. The development of the 
number of bank relationships seems to have been demand-driven as well as supply-driven for 
medium-sized firms, but only supply-driven for very small and small firms. Supply-side 
reductions resulted from the merger between two big banks and changes in credit risk 
management at major banks. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, much research has been concerned with explaining the number of bank 
relationships of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). Information-based theories of 
financial intermediation show that the optimal number of banks from which a small or young 
firm should borrow is small. While according to Diamond’s delegated monitoring model 
(Diamond 1984), a single bank relationship is most efficient if a firm borrows once, models of 
repeated lending show that it is optimal to hold a few bank relationships.
1 By borrowing from 
more than one informed bank, the firm may save hold-up costs that arise if the first lending 
bank uses its superior information to extract monopoly rents through future loans (Sharpe 
1990, Rajan 1992). However, it should not borrow from many banks, because this would 
imply a higher probability of being credit rationed (Thakor 1996, Angelini/Di Salvo/Ferri 
1998). The resulting “one-to-few” hypothesis has been confirmed for some countries such as 
Germany (Harhoff/Körting 1998, Elsas/Krahnen 1998, Räthke 2005), the US (Petersen/Rajan 
1994), Norway (Ongena/Smith 2001) and Sweden (Berglöf/Sjögren 1998), but not for the 
majority of countries in a cross-section analysis of 20 European countries (Ongena/Smith 
2000b). The evidence of a large cross-country variation in the number of bank relationships 
with a prevalence of multiple banking relationships even at small firms has induced further 
theoretical and empirical research (Detragiache/Garella/Guiso 2000, Farinha/Santos 2002, 
Machauer/Weber 2000, Räthke 2005). 
In empirical studies on the benefits of relationship banking to SMEs the number of bank 
relationships has been often used as a proxy for the strength of the bank-customer relationship 
or indicator of competition between credit granting banks.
2 However, it may also be an 
indicator of borrower quality or size (Machauer/Weber 2000). First, a higher number of 
lenders may signal bad quality, because a high quality firm is more likely to get additional 
funds from the first informed lender (Petersen/Rajan 1994) or because multiple banking 
reduces monitoring incentives (Foglia/Laviola/Reedtz 1998). Secondly, large firms tend to 
hold more bank relationships than smaller ones, because they need larger loans or a wider 
range of bank services that a single bank might not be able to provide (Ongena/Smith 2001). 
Moreover, the number of bank relationships may be affected by characteristics of the banks or 
                                                           
1    For surveys on relationship banking see Boot (2000), Ongena/Smith (2000a) and Elyasiani/Goldberg (2004). 
2    See e.g. Petersen/Rajan (1994), Cole (1998), Harhoff/Körting (1998, 2003), Machauer/Weber (1998), 
D’AuriaFoglia/Reedtz (1999), Ongena/Smith (2001), Ferri/Kang/Kim (2001), Menkhoff/Neuberger/-
Suwanaporn (2005); for an overview see Lehmann/Neuberger/Räthke (2004). 
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the stability of the banking sector, with a higher incidence of multiple banking relationships 
in more fragile environments (Detragiache/Garella/Guiso 2000).  
An unresolved question not tackled in the literature yet is whether the observed number of 
bank relationships is determined by the demand side or the supply side. It may be demand-
driven if it reflects the optimum number dependent on firm specific financial requirements, or 
supply-driven, if it reflects the availability of potential lenders or credit market concentration. 
In a highly concentrated regional or local banking market, a small number of banking 
relationships may simply reflect the fact that a firm’s demand for more banking relationships 
is rationed. Especially the markets of loans to SMEs are local in nature, because they are 
characterized by asymmetric information. Banks can be seen as delegated monitors in these 
markets (Diamond 1984). The closer to the customers they are located the lower are their 
monitoring costs.
3  
Also a change in the number of bank relationships through time may be demand-driven or 
supply-driven. A decline may result from a supply-side reduction of the number of banks 
through a merger or through a change in banks’ credit risk management, but also from a 
demand-side substitution of bank loans by alternative forms of finance. A thorough 
interpretation of the observed data thus requires a disaggregated analysis of both the demand 
side and the supply side. The present paper conducts such an analysis for the SME bank loan 
market in Switzerland disaggregated with respect to firm sizes, industries (manufacturing 
industry, trade/hotel and restaurant industry, services) and banking groups (big banks, 
cantonal banks, regional banks and savings banks, mutual banks, other banks).
4 We seek to 
provide explanations for the change in the number of bank relationships of SMEs in the 
period 1996-2002, using a data set based on 1700 firm surveys in 1996 and 2002, 
respectively.  
In the period 1996-2002, the domestic credit volume of Swiss banks decreased by 16.1%,  
which cannot be explained by a cyclical reduction of demand (Schacht 2005)
5. Within this 
                                                           
3   Evidence indicates that local market areas for households and small businesses are generally appropriate for 
analyzing the competitive effects of bank mergers (Rhoades 1996, p. 344). 
4   Cantonal banks are state-owned and have to take public interests into consideration. Their primary business 
area is the canton, but they also provide services beyond the cantonal borders since some years. Regional 
banks and savings banks provide services similar to those of the cantonal banks, but differ from these by 
their legal form and by a geographically more limited business area. Mutual banks (Raiffeisenbanken) are 
cooperative banks specializing in retail banking. 
5   An economic slowdown can only be observed since the second half of 2000. It cannot explain why the credit 
volume declined most at the big banks (Schacht 2005, p. 79). 
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period, the supply side of the Swiss loan market was subject to profound changes: in 1998, 
the merger between UBS and SBC, two of the three Swiss big banks caused a substantial 
increase in market concentration (with a rise in the Herfindahl index from 1.998 to 2.450), 
which has thus reached the highest level in European banking markets (Schacht 2005).
6 
Moreover, especially big Swiss banks changed their credit risk management in these years. 
They introduced risk-adjusted pricing based on internal ratings in 1997, long before the 
consultations on the Basle II accord. This was a reaction to their large loan losses in the first 
half of the 1990s (Eidgenössische Bankenkommission 2003, p. 27, Schacht 2005, pp. 25). 
Other banks, especially the cantonal banks followed, but did not introduce risk-adjusted 
pricing to the same extent.
7 Simultaneously, the demand for bank relationships is likely to 
have changed. On the one hand, progress in information technology tends to reduce personal 
communication, which leads to a higher standardisation of bank products and a lower binding 
of customers to their housebanks.
8 This favours multiple banking relationships at a firm. On 
the other hand, firms may demand less lending relationships, because the availability of 
substitutes for bank loans has increased due to financial innovations or deregulations. A 
changing demand for bank relationships can refer to a broad range of banking services, or 
only to the lending business. Therefore, we will differentiate between overall bank 
relationships that refer to all banking services and lending relationships that refer to business 
loans in a narrow sense. 
So far, there is hardly evidence on the number of bank relationships in Switzerland. We only 
know of the cross-country evidence for large corporations in the year 1996, where 
Switzerland belongs to the countries with the lowest number of lending relationships 
(Ongena/Smith 2000b). The median number of bank relationships used for cash management 
purposes was two, and 41.7% of Swiss firms maintained only one bank relationship. Our 
sample for smaller firms supports this finding and shows that the concentration of lending 
relationships in Switzerland has even increased until 2002. We find different developments of 
                                                           
6   For studies on the impact of this merger on competition in the retail banking segment see Neven/von Ungern 
Sternberg (1998) and Egli/Rime (1999). The latter already showed large effects of a hypothetical UBS-SBC 
merger in 1997 on the Herfindahl indices for different retail banking markets. 
7   The interest rate spread between the best and the worst rating of an SME borrower is higher at the biggest 
banks than at the cantonal banks. From 1997 to 1998, the average interest rate on SME loans was raised by 
3% at the big banks, but only by 1.2% at the cantonal banks (Task Force KMU 1999, p. 7, Schacht 2005, 
p.54 ).  
8   For the US, there is evidence that the information revolution has induced small firms to choose more distant 
lenders and communicate with them in more impersonal ways, thus gaining greater access to credit 
(Petersen/Rajan 2002). On the effects of technological progress on the EU banking markets see ECB (1999). 
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the bank relationships for different customer segments and banking groups, which we seek to 
explain on the basis of theoretically-derived hypotheses. While for medium-sized firms, the 
development of the number of bank relationships can be explained by changes in demand and 
supply, for the smallest and small firms it can be only explained by supply-side changes. 
Especially the merger between two of the three biggest banks caused a reduction in loans and 
bank relationships to very small and small enterprises, which was not compensated by an 
increase at other banks. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations and previous 
evidence for the US and Italy. Our findings do not only put into perspective the results of 
other empirical studies, but also the numbers reported by some banks with respect to their 
market shares in lending. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data set, our 
measurements of the number of bank relationships and hypotheses. Section 3 presents our 
empirical analysis for the different measurements. Section 4 summarizes the results and draws 
conclusions. 
2. Data, measurements and hypotheses 
2.1. Data  
Our source of information about bank relationships are surveys of firms in 1996 and 2002, 
conducted by the market research institution DemoSCOPE on behalf of the Verband 
Schweizerischer Kantonalbanken VSKB (association of Swiss regional banks). By phone 
interviews of  managers who are responsible for the finance of their firms a sample of about 
1700 cases was obtained in both years. The basic population comprises Swiss SMEs with 1 to 
199 employees. The sample was apportioned according to the size classes 1-3, 4-9, 10-49 and 
50-199 employees. Within these classes, the interviews were allocated to the cantons 
proportionally to the actual number of firms. The allocation of the interviewed firms to the 
size classes is evenly stratified. This means that conclusions for the total population can be 
drawn on the basis of the single size classes by weighting with their actual proportions. We 
adjusted the size classes of the survey to those of the Swiss business and loan statistics, 
defining the following three categories: “very small firms” with 1-9 employees, “small firms” 
with 10-49 employees and “medium-sized firms” with 50-249 employees. To aggregate single 
observations over firm sizes or industries, they must be weighted according to the actual size 
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structure or industry structure. The most recent census of Swiss enterprises yields the 
structure of SMEs shown in table 1. 




trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services total 
60,609 22.5% 86,248 32.0% 122,885 45.6% 269,742 1-9  
employees  80.4%  19.8% 89.4% 28.2% 91.8% 40.2%  88.2%
12,101 39.7% 9,104 29.9% 9,267 30.4%  30,472 10-49 
employees  16.05%  4.0% 9.4% 3.0% 6.9% 3.0%  10.0%
2,680 47.9% 1,138 20.3% 1,775 31.7%  5,593 50-249 
employees  3.55%  0.9% 1.2% 0.4% 1.3% 0.6%  1.9%
total 75,390  24.7% 96,490 31.6% 133,927 43.8%  305,807
Explanation: In the manufacturing industry 80.4% of all enterprises (60,609 out of 75,390) are very small, while 
22.5% of the very small enterprises (60,609 out of 269,742) belong to the manufacturing industry. 19.8% of all 
SMEs are very small enterprises in the manufacturing industry.  
Source: own composition 
2.2 Measurements of bank relationships 
Firm surveys on the number of bank relationships may ask for overall bank relationships that 
result from the whole range of banking services or lending relationships that result from a 
bank loan. Because of alternative forms of external finance and internal finance, not all firms 
hold a lending relationship. Hence, we can differentiate between three levels of possible 
relationships (see table 2). The first level describes the overall bank relationships of all firms 
in the sample. The next two levels refer to the sub-sample of the borrowing firms. On level 2 
we still ask the firms for their overall bank relationships, while on level 3 we ask them for 
their lending relationships.  
Another measure for the strength of a bank-customer relationship is the incidence of a 
housebank or main bank relationship versus additional or ‘minor’ bank relationships. A 
housebank is usually defined as the major lender of a firm and does not preclude that the firm 
holds multiple banking relationships. For German universal banks the incidence of a 
housebank status has been shown to be positively related to the bank’s share of borrower debt 
financing, but negatively related to the firm’s number of bank relationships (Elsas 2005). 
Hence, the observation that a firm holds only one or a small number of lending relationships 
is an indicator of a housebank relationship. While the latter is always a lending relationship, 
additional or ‘minor’ bank relationships can refer to bank loans as well as other bank services.  
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Table 2: Three levels of bank-customer relationships 
  Firms in the sample  Bank-firm relationships 
Level 1  all firms  overall bank relationship 
Level 2  borrowing firms  overall bank relationships  
(at least 1 lending relationship) 
Level 3  borrowing firms  lending relationships 
Source: own composition 
Most of the previous empirical studies on relationship banking measure the number of bank 
relationships by considering only lending relationships (Petersen/Rajan 1994, Elsas/Krahnen 
1998, Machauer/Weber 2000, Harhoff/Körting 1998, 2003, Berglöf/Sjögren 1998, 
Detragiache/Garella/Guiso 2000, Ongena/Smith 2001, Ferri/Kang/Kim 2001, Farinha/Santos 
2002). Exceptions are Cole (1998) who asks all firms for the number of sources of financial 
services and Ongena/Smith (2000b) who ask all firms for the number of banks they use for 
cash management services. Since, however, short-term lending is one of the most important 
activities in cash management, the numbers of bank relationships in the latter sample do not 
differ much from those in the other studies (Ongena/Smith 2000b, pp.32). Also the 
observations for the number of lending relationships in these studies are not directly 
comparable because they consider different types of bank loans (e.g. some include lines of 
credit, others not).  
In the following analysis of the Swiss loan market, we will focus on bank-customer 
relationships on levels 2 and 3. The number of borrowing firms is defined as the number of 
firms that use an investment credit, a working capital credit or a mortgage credit granted by a 
bank. The resulting ratio of the number of borrowing firms to the number of all firms, the so-
called bank loan ratio, is an indicator of the importance of bank finance to the firms in our 
sample: 
firms all of number
firms borrowing of number
ratio loan Bank =
 
The number of a firm’s overall bank relationships is obtained from its answers to the survey 
question “At which bank or banks is your firm a customer?”. Its mean over all firms 
(borrowing firms) is given by the ratio of the total number of overall bank relationships to the 
number of all firms (borrowing firms), which we will call bank relationship ratio: 
firms all of number
ips relationsh bank overall of number
level firms all of ratio ip relationsh Bank = ) 1 (
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firms borrowing of number
ips relationsh bank overall of number
level firms borrowing of ratio ip relationsh Bank = ) 2 (
 
The number of a firm’s lending relationships results from its answers to the survey question 
„At which bank or banks does your firm use an investment credit, a working capital credit or 
a mortgage credit?”. Its mean over all borrowing firms is given by the ratio of the total 
number of lending relationships to the number of borrowing firms, which we will call lending 
relationship ratio: 
firms borrowing of number
ips relationsh lending of number
level firms borrowing of ratio ip relationsh Lending = ) 3 (
 
Analogously, bank loan ratios, bank relationship ratios and lending relationship ratios can be 
calculated on a more disaggregated basis for different kinds of loans and different banking 
groups. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Before investigating the development of the above ratios, we formulate hypotheses about 
expected changes in demand and supply. Theoretically, changes in the demand for bank 
loans, bank relationships or lending relationships may result from a change in the 
substitutability with respect to alternative forms of finance or from a change in the customers’ 
preferences or attitudes. The substitutability of bank services is likely to increase, first, due to 
financial innovations and technological change that reduce transaction costs and thus 
customers’ switching costs. Secondly, it may increase by regulatory changes, which ease the 
capital market access of SMEs or reduce barriers of entries for non-bank intermediaries. At 
the same time, customers may feel less bound to their housebanks, and develop preferences 
towards multiple banking relationships.  
A demand-side substitution of bank finance by alternative forms of finance or of one bank by 
another can also be supply-induced, if e.g. some banks become more restrictive in their 
lending policy and demand higher risk premiums. We try to disentangle these supply-induced 
demand changes from “pure” demand changes by considering firms of different size. Small, 
informationally opaque firms are more likely to get rationed and have less access to 
alternatives of bank finance than larger firms. Therefore, we expect that “pure” demand 
  9 
changes are to be found mainly at the larger, medium-sized firms. With respect to the demand 
for bank loans, we hypothesize: 
H1: The number of bank loans decreased at larger firms (medium-sized firms), because they 
have substituted investment credits, working capital credits or mortgage credits by 
alternative forms of finance (‘reduction of demand’). 
The demand for the number of bank relationships or lending relationships, however, is likely 
to have increased due to a decline in the binding of customers to their housebank or an 
increased willingness to hold multiple banking relationships. Since larger firms need a larger 
range of financial services and more or larger loans to be diversified at several banks than 
smaller firms, we expect a larger increase of the number of relationships at larger firms: 
H2: The number of bank relationships or lending relationships increased at larger firms 
(medium-sized firms), because these feel less bound to their housebanks and wish to use 
a larger number of banks for different financial services or larger loans (‘increase in 
demand’).  
Changes in the supply of bank loans, bank relationships or lending relationships may result 
from changes in the number of banks in the market (market structure) or from changes in the 
banks’ strategies (market conduct). Considering the merger between the two biggest banks 
UBS and SBC, we expect that it affected all SMEs. Since the services offered by the big 
banks are differentiated and thus not perfectly substitutable to the services provided by the 
other banking groups,
9 the merger-induced supply reduction cannot be compensated by other 
banks, so that we expect an overall supply reduction. Moreover, the supply reduction is likely 
to be largest at relatively small and opaque firms. For this class of borrowers, relationship 
lending is superior to other forms of financing, resulting from the banks’ comparative 
advantage in screening and monitoring. If the information generated by the bank-firm 
relationship cannot be fully transferred to other lenders, these firms are especially vulnerable 
to shocks that affect banks, which may result from mergers. Also changes in management or 
restructuring after a merger can cause a loss of soft information especially on these firms. 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti/Gobbi 2003, p. 7). This view is supported by previous evidence for other 
countries. In the US, banks involved in mergers tended to reduce their portfolio share of small 
                                                           
9   The big banks offer their products nationwide. They have a centralised credit office where all applications 
are technically handled. The cantonal and regional banks have better access to local markets due to closeness 
to their customers. This is an advantage especially when offering loans to the smallest enterprises.  
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business loans (Berger/Udell 1989 and Berger/Demsetz/Strahan 1999). Recent studies for 
Italy showed that consolidation disrupted above all credit relationships of small businesses 
(Sapienza 2002), without however reducing credit availability, because borrowers are able to 
find other sources of credit (Bonaccorsi di Patti/Gobbi 2003).
10 Multiple banking 
relationships seem to insure Italian firms against idiosyncratic shocks to banks 
(Detragiache/Garella/Guiso 2000). However, we do not expect that this also holds for 
Switzerland, where multiple banking does not prevail.
11 Thus, we hypothesize 
H3: The number of bank loans, bank relationships and lending relationships decreased at the 
big banks, because two of the biggest banks merged. Because of imperfect 
substitutability, the reduction at the big banks was only partially compensated by an 
increase at other banks. This applies especially to relatively small firms and opaque or 
intangible industries (‘reduction of supply’).  
Considering the banks’ strategies, the changes in credit risk management with introduction of 
risk-adjusted pricing (mainly by the big banks and bigger cantonal banks) are likely to have 
reduced the supply of loans and banking relationships, especially to firms with relatively high 
credit risk and information opacity. Again, these are above all very small and small 
enterprises or firms with intangible assets. Hence, we hypothesize 
H4: The number of bank loans, bank relationships and lending relationships decreased at 
relatively small firms and opaque or intangible industries, because major banks (big 
banks and bigger cantonal banks) restructured their portfolios or introduced risk-adjusted 
pricing with higher requests for information about borrower quality. This induced these 
firms to increase the number of their relationships with other banks (‘reduction of 
supply’). 
                                                           
10   For a review and discussion on the available evidence see Bonaccorsi di Patti/Gobbi (2003). 
11   In the cross-country study of  Ongena/Smith (2000b), Italy is the country with the highest number of lending 
relationships. In 1996, the median number was 12, while it was 2 in Switzerland. 
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3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. The bank loan ratio 
The bank loan ratio in an industry is calculated by the weighted sum of the observed bank 
loan ratios in the single firm size classes, where the weights correspond to the actual ratios of 
the firm size classes in that industry (see table 1).
12 For the whole SME sector, the bank loan 
ratio was 48.5% in 2002, which means that less than half of all firms have a bank loan. Table 
3 shows the bank loan ratios for the three industries and firm size classes in 2002 as well as 
their changes from 1996 to 2002.  
Obviously, bank loan ratios tend to increase with firm size and are higher in the 
manufacturing industry than in the other sectors. A demand-side explanation is that larger 
firms and firms in the manufacturing industry need more loans to finance investments in 
physical capital than smaller firms or firms in the non-manufacturing sector. A supply-side 
explanation is that small, informationally opaque firms and firms in intangible industries with 
less collateral are more likely to be credit rationed or to obtain loans at higher costs than 
larger firms or firms with more tangible assets.  
Also the changes in the bank loan ratios from 1996 to 2002 differ substantially between 
industries and firm size classes. We examined the significance of the difference between a 
bank loan ratio in 2002 and 1996 for all 16 cases in table 3. The results are reported by the 
respective z-values in parentheses and the 90%, 95% and 99% significance levels.
13
                                                           
12  For the manufacturing industry, e.g., we obtain 54.1% x 80.4% + 73.8% x 16.05% + 73.1% x 3.55% = 
57.9% 
13   The variations in the significance levels are partly due to the different sizes of the sub-samples underlying 
the single fields. Note that the significance tests for the sums over industries and firm sizes indicate 
significant differences only for the sample, since they are not based on a weighted basic population. E.g. in 
table 2, the change of the weighted average in the services sector –9.4% results from the difference between 
50.7% (1996) and 41.3% (2002) and not from the sum of the weighted differences in the single size classes. 
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Table 3: Bank loan ratios of SMEs in Switzerland (2002 vs. 1996)  
manufacturing 
industry 
trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services  weighted  
average 
2002      vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
   (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
54.1% -1.7%  49.6% -8.2%  39.9% -9.4%  46.2% -7.4%  1-9 empl. 
     (0.371)   (2.019)**  (2.288)**  (2.812)***
73.8% +4.0%  61.9% -9.2%  54.7% -8.8%  64.4% -3.8%  10-49 empl. 
    (0.921)  (1.509)  (1.196)  (0.661) 
73.1%  -9.2%  71.1% +7.7%  72.3% +7.7%  72.5% +0.1%  50-249 empl. 
     (2.576)***   (1.042)  (0.991)  (1.061) 
57.9% -1.4% 51.0% -8.2% 41.3% -9.4% 48.5%  -7.2%  weighted  
average   (1.615)  (1.529)   (2.285)**   (2.818)***
* 90% significance; ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance 
Explanation: The significance levels over all firm sizes for a given industry (last row) and all industries for a 
given size class (right column) refer to the respective sub-sample and not to the weighted average calculated for 
the whole sample  
Source: own calculation 
 
We observe substantial reductions of bank loan ratios from 1996 to 2002: the average bank 
loan ratio of SMEs decreased significantly by 7.2 percentage points from 55.7% in 1996 to 
48.5% in 2002. To find out whether this reduction has been demand-driven or supply-driven 
according to the above hypotheses, we investigate the developments for different firm sizes 
and industries. 
The results of the significance tests reported in table 3 yield most support for the ‘reduction of 
supply’ hypotheses H3 and H4: comparing different size classes, the reduction is significant 
only at the very small firms (-7.4 percentage points to 46.2%). Comparing different industries, 
the reduction is significant only in the services sector (-9.4 percentage points to 41.3%). 
Consistent with H1, we find that in the manufacturing sector, a significant reduction occurred 
only at medium-sized firms (-9.2 percentage points to 73.1%) which have easier access to 
alternative forms of finance than smaller firms.  
3.2. The number of bank relationships of borrowing firms 
For the sub-sample of all borrowing firms, we investigate the number of overall bank 
relationships (level 2 in table 2). Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the number of 
relationships towards all banks in 2002 compared to 1996. 
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Figure 1: Bank relationships of borrowing SMEs in Switzerland (2002 vs. 1996) 
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Bank relationships of borrowing SMEs in Switzerland (2002 vs. 1996)
 
Source: own calculations 
Consistent with the ‚one-to-few’- hypothesis, the number of bank relationships of Swiss 
SMEs is low: in 2002, 75% of the borrowing firms held one to three bank relationships, with 
nearly 30% having a relationship to a single bank. Only about 10% of the borrowing firms 
held relationships to five or more than five banks.  
The mean number of bank relationships, the above-defined bank relationship ratio, is shown 
in table 4 for 2002 compared to 1996. In both years, it was 2.1 for all borrowing SMEs. A 
disaggregated view shows that the bank relationship ratio increases with firm size in all 
industries. This indicates that larger firms need more bank relationships because they demand 
a wider range of bank services. 
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Table 4: Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards all banks (2002 vs. 1996)  
manufacturing 
industry 
trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services weighted  average 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
 
 (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
1.86  -0.05 1.89  +0.09 2.23  -0,01 2.04  +0.02  1-9 empl. 
    (0.155)  (0.668)  (0.266)  (0.671) 
2.51 -0.18  2.29 +0.03  2.94 +0.28  2.57 +0.02  10-49 empl. 
    (1.197)  (0.088)  (0.657)  (0.473) 
3.58 +0.08  3.30 +0.05  3.06 +0.54  3.36 +0.27  50-249 empl. 
    (0.546)  (0.226)   (2.156)**  (1.174) 
2.03 -0.09 1.95 +0.08 2.29 +0.01 2.11  +0.01  weighted 
average   (1.655)*   (2.313)**   (1.343)    (1.134) 
* 90% significance; ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance 
Explanation: The significance levels over all firm sizes for a given industry (last row) and all industries for a 
given size class (right column) refer to the respective sub-sample and not to the weighted average calculated for 
the whole sample  
Source: own calculation 
Looking at the changes from 1996 to 2002, we observe that the average number of bank 
relationships over all borrowing firms remained stable (with an insignificant increase by 0.01 
percentage points). However, the number of bank relationships was significantly reduced by 
borrowing firms in the manufacturing industry (-0.09 percentage points) and significantly 
increased by those in the trade/hotel and restaurant industry (+0.09 percentage points). While 
these changes are very small, we observe a remarkable increase in the bank relationship ratio 
of the medium-sized services enterprises (+0.54 percentage points). This is consistent with a 
rising demand for bank relationships or lending relationships by these firms according to H2. 
In the non-services sectors, we also observe an increase in the number of  bank relationships 
at medium-sized enterprises, which is, however, insignificant. 
Given that in the period under investigation the supply of potential bank relationships was 
reduced by the merger between two of the three biggest banks and by changes in credit risk 
management of major banks, it is surprising that we do not find support for the ‘reduction of 
supply’ hypotheses H3 and H4. To examine the developments on a more disaggregated level, 
we look at the bank relationship ratios for different banking groups. 
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Table 5: Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards big banks and cantonal 
banks (2002 vs. 1996)  
Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards big banks (2002 vs. 1996)  
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
   (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
0.49 -0.35  0.64 -0.30  0.80 -0,37  1-9 empl. 
   (3.005)***  (3.403)***  (3.008)*** 
0.81 -0.70  0.78 -0.58  1.13 -0.28  10-49 empl. 
   (6.229)***  (3.898)***   (1.311) 
1.42 -0.69  1.30 -0.73  1.30 -0.19  50-249 empl. 
   (8.084)***  (3.968)***   (0.753) 
Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards cantonal banks (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
    (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
0.48  -0.01 0.38  -0.05 0.52  -0,04  1-9 empl. 
   (0.120)    (0.955)    (0.715) 
0.60 -0.05  0.58 +0.09  0.70  +0.02  10-49 empl. 
   (0.843)    (0.999)    (0.111) 
0.78  +0.07 0.70  +0.06 0.74  +0.12  50-249 empl. 
   (1.437)    (0.573)    (0.130) 
90% significance; ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance 
Source: own calculations 
Table 5 shows the bank relationship ratios towards the banks with the highest market shares, 
the big banks and the cantonal banks. We observe that the demand for services at these banks 
increases with firm size. Since in 2002 each firm had access only to one cantonal bank
14, but 
to two big banks (versus three big banks in 1996), the bank relationship ratio towards the big 
banks always exceeds that towards the cantonal banks.  
Consistent with H3, we observe a significant reduction of the number of bank relationships 
towards the big banks in 7 out of the 9 fields in table 5, which was not compensated by an 
increase in the number of bank relationships towards the cantonal banks in the period 1996-
2002. In 1996, the medium-sized borrowing firms held on average 1.9 relationships (not 
reported in table 5) to the hitherto three big banks, while in 2002 they held on average 1.4 
                                                           
14   Even if cantonal banks offer some services (mainly private banking) beyond cantonal borders, this does not 
affect the SME loan markets. In fact, each SME has access only to the cantonal bank of the canton where it is 
located. 
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relationships to the remaining two big banks.
15 Thus, in 2002, they still held on average more 
than one relationship to a big bank, but only in three out of four cases a relationship to a 
cantonal bank. An explanation is that medium-sized firms have comparatively more complex 
financing needs and use more bank services for their international businesses, which are 
provided to a larger extent by the big banks than by the cantonal banks.
16 Thus, relationships 
to cantonal banks and big banks are not perfect substitutes. Another explanation is that the 
loan volumes demanded by the medium-sized firms (with an average credit limit of 
13  millions  CHF) cannot be provided by a single (big) bank. Since the overall bank 
relationships of the borrowing firms go beyond their lending relationships, we cannot 
conclude whether the observed changes result from the lending business or from other bank 
products.  
In the services sector, the reduction in the number of bank relationships towards the big banks 
is significant only at the smallest firms. This is consistent with our expectation that these 
firms were more affected by the big banks’ merger (H3) or their risk-adjusted pricing than the 
larger firms (H4), but also with our expectation that only the larger firms increased their 
demand for the number of bank relationships (H2), thus substituting the bank relationship loss 
through the merger by a new relationship to the second big bank. 
Table 6 shows the bank relationship ratios towards the remaining banks, i.e. mutual banks, 
regional banks and savings banks, and other banks (without Post). 
                                                           
15   This weighted average is not reported in table 4. 
16   In 2002, 16 % of the SMEs used international bank services, 70 % of which were provided by the big banks. 
This is about four times the volume provided by the cantonal banks, in 1996 as well as in 2002 (source: own 
calculations).
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Table 6: Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards remaining banks  
(2002 vs. 1996) 
Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards mutual banks (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
   (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
0.34 +0.03  0.25 +0.05  0.34 +0.12  1-9 empl. 
   (0.521)  (1.169)   (2.121)** 
0.29 +0.03  0.19 +0.06  0.28 +0.07  10-49 empl. 
   (0.506)  (1.099)  (0.878) 
0.18 +0.01  0.09 +0.07  0.11 -0.03  50-249 empl. 
   (0.241)  (1.493)  (0.393) 
Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards regional banks and savings banks (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
   (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
0.22 +0.01  0.19 -0.01  0.24 +0.08  1-9 empl. 
    (0.174)  (0.261)   (1.680)* 
0.20 +0.04  0.22 +0.08  0.23 +0.05  10-49 empl. 
   (0.812)  (1.310)  (0.598) 
0.23 +0.04  0.11 -0.02  0.09 -0.01  50-249 empl. 
    (0.952)  (0.378)  (0.160) 
Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards other banks (without Post) (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
   (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
1-9  empl.  0.08  +0.01 0.14  +0.09 0.11  -0.02 
     (0.403)   (2.843)***   (0.711) 
10-49 empl.  0.17  +0.07  0.14  0.00  0.26  +0.07 
     (1.966)**    (0.493)    (0.997) 
50-249  empl.  0.36  +0.04 0.47  +0.05 0.26  +0.07 
     (0.929)  (0.375)  (0.958) 
* 90% significance; ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance 
Source: own calculations 
The remaining banks usually hold a quarter to a third of all bank relationships. Among them, 
the mutual banks have a dominant position in the market segment of the very small firms. 
Examining the changes in the period 1996-2002, we observe that the bank relationship ratios 
of the largest SMEs (medium-sized firms) towards the remaining banks remained stable. 
Thus, there is no support for hypothesis H2. However, the evidence that most of the very 
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small and small firms which lost bank relationships towards the big banks increased their 
bank relationships towards remaining banks (in 4 out of 18 fields significantly), is consistent 
with H4. In 2002, very small services enterprises hold significantly more relationships with 
mutual banks, regional banks and savings banks, and very small firms in the trade/hotel and 
restaurant industry as well as small manufacturing firms hold significantly more relationships 
with other banks.  
The group of the remaining banks does not include the Post (or its business segment 
PostFinance), which was a possible bank relationship in 2002, but not in 1996. As shown in 
table 7, the bank relationship ratios towards the Post in 2002 close the gaps between the 
overall changes in the bank relationship ratios and the sums of the changes within the groups 
considered above.  
Table 7: Bank relationship ratios of borrowing SMEs towards the PostFinance in 2002  
  manufacturing industry trade/hotel and 
restaurant industry 
services 
1-9 empl.  0.26  0.30  0.22 
10-49 empl.  0.43  0.38  0.34 
50-249 empl.  0.61  0.63  0.57 
E.g.: differences in manufacturing industry for 1-9 employees:  
cantonal banks:  -0.01   
big banks:  -0.35  The difference over all banks was -0,05. 
mutual banks:  +0.03  The ratio towards the PostFinance of 0.26 
regional/savings banks:  +0.01  added to -0.31 is -0.05. 
other (without Post):  +0.01   
Sum: -0.31   
Source: own calculations 
 
Thus, SMEs have substituted relationships with the Post for relationships with other, 
especially big banks. To see whether this substitution also concerns the loan market, we will 
examine the lending relationship ratios on level 3.
17
                                                           
17   According to a press release on 17th february 2004, the PostFinance has reached total assets of 43 billion 
CHF, a market share of about 66% in payments transactions and more than 250,000 SME relationships of its 
holding company Die Post. The credit limits of its standardised loan products, which were not offered yet in 
the period of our investigation, are in the range of 0.1 to 10.0 million CHF.
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3.3. The number of lending relationships of borrowing firms 
On level 3, we investigate the number of lending relationships of the borrowing SMEs. 
Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of the number of lending relationships towards all 
banks in 2002 compared to 1996.  
Figure 2: Lending relationships of borrowing SMEs in Switzerland (2002 vs. 1996) 
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Lending relationships of borrowing SMEs in Switzerland (2002 vs. 1996)
 
Source: own calculations  
 
Obviously, the lending relationships are more concentrated than the bank relationships. In 
2002, nearly half of all borrowing SMEs lent only from one bank and four out of five (78%) 
lent from one or two banks. 10% of the borrowing firms held four or more than four lending 
relationships. Since 1996, concentration in the lending relationships has increased. 
The mean number of lending relationships, the above-defined lending relationship ratio, is 
shown in table 8 for 2002 compared to 1996. For the whole sample, it was 1.59 in 2002, after 
1.99 in 1996. The latter corresponds to the medium number of 2 for larger Swiss firms in the 
sample of Ongena/Smith (2000b) for the same year. A disaggregated view on our sample 
shows that in all industries larger firms hold more lending relationships than smaller firms. 
This is consistent with the evidence for other countries (Machauer/Weber 2000, 
Ongena/Smith 2001) and indicates that larger firms diversify their lending relationships to 
save hold-up costs or that the banks share the higher risks of the larger loans demanded by 
these firms. 
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restaurant industry  services  weighted 
average 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
 
 (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)
1.66 +0.32 1.46 -1.00 1.56 -0.30 1.55 -0.40  1-9 empl. 
 (0.469)  (1.372)  (0.568)  (1.220) 
2.01 +0.00 1.70 -0.66 1.77 -0,79 1.84 -0.44  10-49 empl. 
 (1.902)*  (1.834)*   (0.962)    (2.592)**
* 
2.60 -0.60 2.66 +0.95 1.94 -0.28 2.40 -0.16  50-249 empl. 
 (1.450)  (0.248)  (0.026)  (1.056) 
1.75 +0.21 1.50 -0.94 1.58 -0.34 1.59 -0.40  weighted 
average   (2.756)***   (0.837)  (0.885)   (2.366)**
90% significance; ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance 
Explanation: The significance levels over all firm sizes for a given industry (last row) and all industries for a 
given size class (right column) refer to the respective sub-sample and not to the weighted average calculated for 
the whole sample 
Source: own calculations 
 
Contrary to the bank relationship ratio over all banks, which remained stable in the period 
1996-2002, the lending relationship ratio over all banks declined significantly by 20% (0.4 
percentage points). This decline seems to be concentrated on small firms and on non-
manufacturing industries. In the manufacturing industry, the number of lending relationships 
increased significantly. To test our hypotheses about changes in demand and supply, we again 
disaggregate the lending relationship ratio with respect to different banking groups.  
Table 9 shows the lending relationship ratios towards the three banking groups with the 
highest market shares: the big banks, the cantonal banks and the mutual banks. Their 
combined share of the market for SME loans was 90% in 2002. 
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Table 9: Lending relationship ratios towards different banking groups (2002 vs.1996)  
Lending relationship ratios towards big banks (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and 
restaurant industry  services weighted  average 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
 
 (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)   (z-value) 
0.49 -0.04 0.57 -0.64 0.55  -0.39  0.54 -0.40  1-9 empl. 
 (1.657)*   (2.338)**  (2.516)**   (4.048)***
0.78 +0.25 0.74 -0.60 0.83  -0,47  0.78 -0.42  10-49 empl. 
 (3.224)***  (2.621)***   (0.773)   (4.113)***
1.35 -0.59 1.30 +0.09 1.04  -0.11  1.24 -0.27  50-249 empl. 
  (3.248)***    (1.862)*   (0.037)   (3.315)***
0.57 -0.11 0.59 -0.63 0.58  -0.40  0.58 -0.40  weighted  
average   (5.413)***  (2.736)***   (2.242)**   (6.163)***
Lending relationship ratios towards cantonal banks (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and 
restaurant industry  services weighted  average 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
 
 (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
0.55 +0.16 0.35 -0.34 0.48 -0.07 0.45 -0.11  1-9 empl. 
 (0.442)  (0.920)  (0.053)  (0.021) 
0.64 +0.00 0.59 +0.01 0.49 -0,30 0.58 -0.09  10-49 empl. 
 (0.728)  (0.456)  (1.026)  (0.624) 
0.86 +0.06 0.81 +0.41 0.70 -0.13 0.80 +0.06  50-249 empl. 
  (1.992)**   (1.598)  (0.026)   (2.274)**
0.57 +0.12 0.38 -0.30 0.49 -0.09 0.47 -0.10  weighted  
average   (0.871)  (0.903)  (0.395)  (1.150) 
Lending relationship ratios towards mutual banks (2002 vs. 1996) 
manufacturing industry  trade/hotel and  
restaurant industry  services weighted  average 
2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996  2002     vs.   1996 
 
 
   (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value)  (z-value) 
1-9  empl.  0.32 +0.16  0.27 +0.07  0.23 +0.15  0.26 +0.12 
     (1.611)    (2.177)**   (3.013)***    (4.008)***
0.25 +0.15  0.07 +0.00  0.17 +0.13  0.17 +0.10  10-49 empl. 
    (2.408)**   (0.237)   (2.113)**   (3.115)***
0.06 -0.05  0.11 +0.11  0.04 -0.06  0.06 -0.03  50-249 empl. 
    (1.107)  (1.460)  (1.008)  (1.054) 
0.30 +0.16 0.24 +0.06 0.23 +0.15  0.25%  +0.12  weighted  
average   (2.325)**   (1.778)*    (2.965)***    (4.039)***
* 90% significance; ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance 
Explanation: The significance levels over all firm sizes for a given industry (last row) and all industries for a 
given size class (right column) refer to the respective sub-sample and not to the weighted average calculated for 
the whole sample. 
Source: own calculations 
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The lending relationship ratios towards the big banks declined on average and in 14 out of the 
16 respective fields, mostly at a significance level of 95-99%. This supports the ‘reduction of 
supply’ hypothesis H3. The decline is largest at the very small and small firms and in the non-
manufacturing industries (which tend to have less tangible assets), consistent with H3, but 
also with H4. Despite the merger, the lending relationship ratio of the largest, i.e. medium-
sized firms declined only slightly from 1.51 to 1.24, while that of the smallest firms declined 
sharply from 0.94 to 0.54. The number of lending relationships towards the cantonal banks 
remained stable on average, but increased significantly for medium-sized firms. This supports 
our ‘increase in demand’ hypothesis H2. At the mutual banks, we observe a significant 
increase in the number of lending relationships, both on average and in 10 out of the 16 
respective fields. This may be induced by a reduction of supply at the big banks or cantonal 
banks consistent with hypotheses H3 and H4. Since the medium-sized firms did not increase 
their lending relationships to the mutual banks, we find no evidence in favour of H2 here. 
Regarding the very small and small firms, we conclude that they have significantly 
substituted lending relationships with big banks by those with mutual banks. This does not 
seem to be a pure merger effect, because also the cantonal banks lost market shares towards 
these firms. Hence, lending to this customer segment may have become less attractive to both 
big banks and cantonal banks because of comparatively low profitability. Their portfolio 
restructurings seem to have significantly reduced the number of lending relationships towards 
very small and small firms, in line with H4. Considering that in 2002, each firm had access to 
one cantonal bank, two big banks, one mutual bank and other minor banks, we can derive the 
following ranking of banks from table 9: very small and small firms held more lending 
relationships to their local cantonal bank than to the larger big bank, and very small firms lent 
even more often from their local mutual bank than from the second big bank. The medium-
sized firms, however, lent about as often from the larger of the two big banks as from the 
local cantonal bank.  
Unlike the bank relationships on level 2, the lending relationships towards the above banking 
groups were not substituted by those towards the PostFinance. Hence, the substitution effect 
observed above (table 7) results from payments or other non-lending businesses. Note, 
however, that this observation holds for 2002, and not for today. In 2004, the PostFinance 
entered the nation-wide market for SME loans with standardised credits. This market entry 
has enhanced competition above all in the segment of the very small and small SMEs. 
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Especially the mutual banks, which gained significant loan market shares from the big and 
cantonal banks in this segment
18, are facing a new competitor by the PostFinance now. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
The present paper analysed the number of bank relationships of Swiss SMEs based on firm 
survey data in the years 1996 and 2002. Beyond the usual measurement of lending 
relationships in the literature, we considered bank relationships at three different levels: bank 
relationships of all firms (level 1), bank relationships of the borrowing firms (level 2), and 
lending relationships of the borrowing firms (level 3). While a lending relationship 
necessarily results from a bank loan, a bank relationship may also result from other financial 
services provided by the bank. 
Figure 3 summarizes our quantitative findings for the number of bank relationships of Swiss 
SMEs in 2002. The total of 305,807 SMEs held 602,000 bank relationships, which implies an 
average number of bank relationships of 1.97
19 at level 1. The bank loan ratio of 48.5% 
indicates that less than half of all SMEs have a lending relationship to a bank beyond the 
current account. This ratio has declined significantly since 1996 (by 7.2 percentage points). 
For the borrowing firms, which use an investment credit, a working capital credit or a 
mortgage credit, the average number of bank relationships is 2.11 at level 2. This number has 
remained stable since 1996. However, on average borrowing firms hold only 1.59 lending 
relationships at level 3. Thus, lending relationships are much more concentrated than overall 
bank relationships. The average number between one and two indicates that the housebank 
relationship is dominant in the SME loan market of Switzerland. Contrary to the general 
expectation of a declining role of housebank relationships in Continental Europe, this 
concentration has increased significantly since 1996 (from an average number of lending 
relationships of 1.99). Thus, multiple banking relationships do not insure Swiss SMEs against 
idiosyncratic shocks to banks or against the extraction of monopoly profits in the highly 
concentrated Swiss banking market. 
                                                           
18   mostly as a second bank relationship or for loan volumes not larger than 0.5 million CHF. 
19   This number is representative, because the single observations for different firm sizes and industries were 
weighted according to the actual firm size and industry structure of SMEs obtained from the most recent 
census of Swiss firms in 2001.
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Figure 3: Number of bank relationships of SMEs in 2002 at different levels  
 
number  of   SMEs : 305,807 
1st  level 2nd level 3rd  level
bank loan ratio  : 48.5 %  146,787 
bank relationship  ratio :  1.97 2.12 1.59
effective bank 





Source: own calculations 
 
The present paper found explanations for these developments by investigating the bank 
relationships disaggregated according to firm sizes, industries and banking groups. Thus, we 
were able to test hypotheses about demand-driven versus supply-driven developments for 
three different relationship measures. They postulate (1) a decline in the demand for bank 
loans due to their substitution by alternative forms of finance, (2) an increase in the demand 
for multiple bank relationships due to a lower binding of customers to their housebank, (3) a 
reduction in the supply of bank relationships because of the merger between two big banks 
and (4) a reduction in the supply of bank relationships because of portfolio restructurings or 
changes in credit risk management by major banks. We found differential evidence for these 
hypotheses in different customer segments, which can be broadly summarized as follows: for 
medium-sized firms, the development of the number of bank relationships was demand-driven 
as well as supply-driven: they partially reduced their financing by bank loans, but increased 
their number of bank relationships. Their relationships to the big banks were hardly affected 
by the merger, which indicates that these customers were able to switch to the remaining big 
bank, which seems to have been actively engaged in gaining larger customers. The 
development of the number of bank relationships of the very small and small firms, however, 
was driven mostly by a reduction in supply: their financing by bank loans and their bank 
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relationships with big banks decreased remarkably due to the merger and portfolio 
restructurings by big banks. Therefore, the smallest and small firms redirected their demand 
towards mutual banks. 
Finally, our disaggregated view on the number of bank relationships puts into perspective the 
results of previous empirical studies as well as the numbers reported by some banks with 
respect to their market shares in lending. For example, the number of 140,000 SME customers 
reported by the UBS (UBS Handbook 2003/2004, p.  25) indicates the number of bank 
relationships, but not lending relationships. Given the total numbers in figure 3, this means 
that this bank has relationships with about 46% of all SMEs, but its market share of all bank 
relationships to SMEs (on level 1) is only about 23%. The absolute number of lending 
relationships is far below the reported number of bank relationships. Obviously, further 
comparable research is required in this area. 
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